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Abstract
Although the doctrine of forum non conveniens is unknown in Continental legal systems,
Community law does not prevent English courts from preserving their discretion to stay proceedings, in conflicts involving a defendant domiciliary, in favor of more appropriate courts in
a non-Contracting State. Where the provisions of the Brussels Convention do not address a legal
question, the answer must be sought in the objectives and scheme of the Convention. The English
Court of Appeals in Harrods properly understood that Community law does not require ritualistic reliance on the Convention’s jurisdiction conferring provisions in cases involving a defendant
domiciled in a Contracting State and the jurisdiction of a court in a non-Contracting State.

COMMENT
IN RE HARRODS LTD.: THE BRUSSELS CONVENTION
AND THE PROPER APPLICATION OF FORUM
NON CONVENIENS TO NONCONTRACTING STATES
INTRODUCTION
On September 27, 1968, the Member States of the European Economic Community (the "Community")' adopted the
Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and Recognition ofJudgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (the "Brussels Convention" or the "Convention"). 2 The Member States signatory to
the Brussels Convention (the "Contracting States") enacted
the Convention to harmonize the criteria by which Member
State courts determine and exercise jurisdiction. 3 The drafters
of the Convention did not addressforum non conveniens,4 a doc1. See Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957,
1973 Cr. Brit. T.S. No. 1 (Cmd. 5179-I), 298 U.N.T.S. 3 (1958) [hereinafter EEC
Treaty].
2. 15J.O. L 299 (1968), revised in O.J. L 304/77 (1978), revised in OJ. L 388/30
(1982), in English at O.J. L 285/1 (1989). Citations are to the full text English version
at O.J. L 304/77 (1978) [hereinafter Brussels Convention], unless the cited article
was substantively revised.
3. See Brussels Convention, supra note 2, pmbl., O.J. L 304/77, at 77. The preamble to the Convention states that its purpose is to
strengthen in the Community the legal protection of persons therein established;
[clonsidering that it is necessary for this purpose to determine the international jurisdiction of their courts, to facilitate recognition and to introduce an expeditious procedure for securing the enforcement ofjudgments,
authentic instruments and court settlements.
Id. There doubtless would be considerable difficulty in enforcing judgments in the
courts of a second Contracting State if the respective parties to the suit were constantly able to challenge the propriety of the jurisdiction of the first Contracting
State's courts to have originally heard the suit. See Somafer SA v. Saar-Ferngas AG,
Case 33/78, [1978] E.C.R. 2183, 2190, [1979] 1 C.M.L.R. 490, 501. The Court of
Justice of the European Communities [hereinafter "Court of Justice"] in Sornafer
stated that the Convention provides, inter alia, rules enabling jurisdiction in "matters
of the courts of Contracting States to be determined and facilitating the recognition
and execution of courts' judgments." Id.
4. Black's Law Dictionary defines forum non conveniens as a
[t]erm [that] refers to discretionary power of [a] court to decline jurisdiction
when convenience of [the] parties and the ends ofjustice would be served
....
The doctrine presupposes at least two forums in which the defendant
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trine virtually unknown in continental legal systems, as a basis
5
for declining jurisdiction.
When England became a Contracting State in 1987, however, its common law already included the doctrine offorum non
conveniens.6 As a result of their obligation under the Convention, English courts have recognized that the doctrine is not
available where the litigation involved two Contracting States
to the Convention. 7 Differing with two English commercial
courts, however, the Court of Appeal in In re Harrods Ltd. held
that an English court may stay or dismiss proceedings on the
is amenable to process and furnishes criteria for choice between such forums.
BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 665 (6th ed. 1991).
5. See Peter Schlosser, Report on the Convention on the Association of the Kingdom of
Denmark, Irelandand the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the Convention on jurisdiction and the enforcement ofjudgements in civil and commercial matters and to the
Protocol on its interpretationby the Court ofJustice, OJ. C 59/71, at 97 (1979) [hereinafter
Schlosser Report]. The Schlosser Report noted that
[t]he idea that a national court has discretion in the exercise of its jurisdiction either territorially or as regards the subject matter of a dispute does not
generally exist in Continental legal systems. Even where, in the rules relating to jurisdiction, tests of an exceptionally flexible nature are laid down, no
room is left for the exercise of any discretionary latitude. It is true that Continental legal systems recognize the power of a court to transfer proceedings
from one court to another. Even then the court has no discretion in determining whether or not this power should be exercised.
Id. The Schlosser Report further stated that
[w]here the courts of several States have jurisdiction, the plaintiff has deliberately been given a right of choice, which should not be weakened by application of the doctrine of forum conveniens. The plaintiff may have chosen another apparently 'inappropriate' court from among the competent courts in
order to obtain a judgment in the State in which he also wishes to enforce it.
Id.
6. Id. Professor Schlosser recognized that
the law in the United Kingdom and in Ireland has evolved judicial discretionary powers in certain fields. In some cases, these correspond in practice
to legal provisions regarding jurisdiction which are more detailed in the
Continental States, while in others they have no counterpart on the Continent. It is therefore difficult to evaluate such powers within the context of
the 1968 Convention. A distinction has to be made between the international and national application of this legal concept.
Id.; see infra notes 30-43 and accompanying text (discussing forum non conveniens in
English law).
7. See, e.g., In re Harrods Ltd., [1991] 3 W.L.R. 397 (C.A. 1990) (Dillon, L.J.)
("The court cannot stay or strike or dismiss any proceedings on the ground offorum
non conveniens . . . where the defendant is domiciled in England and the conflict of
jurisdiction is between the jurisdiction of the English court and the jurisdiction of the
courts of some other Contracting State.").
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ground offorum non conveniens when the defendant is a domiciliary of England, but the conflict of jurisdiction involves a nonContracting State court.8
This Comment argues that the Harrods decision and English court utilization of forum non conveniens in deciding cases
involving a conflict ofjurisdiction with a non-Contracting State
is consistent with Community law. Part I examines the applicable provisions of the Brussels Convention and England's implementation of the Convention. Part I also examines English
lower court decisions holding that the Brussels Convention
leaves no room for the application offorum non conveniens. Part
II discusses the factual background and reasoning of the Harrods decision. Part III argues that, as a matter of Community
law, the Brussels Convention did not propose to restrict the
discretion of English courts to apply the doctrine offorum non
conveniens in cases in which no other Contracting State is concerned. This Comment concludes that the Harrods decision
properly relied on the overall scheme and objectives of the
Convention to preserve English court discretion to stay proceedings, in conflicts involving a defendant domiciliary, in
courtesy of more appropriate courts in a non-Contracting
State.
I. THE BRUSSELS CONVENTION AND THE EARLY
REJECTION OF FORUM NON CONVENIENS IN
ENGLAND
A. Jurisdiction Under the Brussels Convention
The Contracting States adopted the Brussels Convention
to establish an expeditious procedure for securing the recogni8. Compare S. & W. Berisford Plc. v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., [1990] 3 W.L.R.
688 (QB.) and Arkwright Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bryanston Ins. Co. Ltd., [1990] 3 W.L.R.
705 (QB.) (holding that Brussels Convention leaves no room for discretionary application offorum non conveniens) with In re Harrods Ltd., [1991] 3 W.L.R. 397 and Re the

"Po," [ 1991] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 206 (C.A.) (holding doctrine offorum non conveniens available to dismiss proceedings on ground that non-Convention State is more appropri-

ate forum in case involving U.K. domiciled defendant). Decisions of the Court of
Appeal are binding on the Commercial Courts. See G. R. RUDD, THE ENGLISH LEGAL
SYSTEM 39-41 (1962). Under the 1971 Protocol to the Convention, however, the
Court of Justice is the final arbiter of questions arising under the Convention. See

The Protocol Concerning the Interpretation of the Convention on Jurisdiction and
Enforcement ofJudgments,June 3, 1971, O.J. L 204/28 (1975), revised in O.J. L 304/
97 (1978), revised in O.J. L 285/1 (1989) [hereinafter Protocol].
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tion and enforcement of judgments obtained in one Member
State of the European Economic Community throughout the
rest of the Community.9 The Convention determines which
court may hear the case and the procedure in which the judgment is recognized and enforced within the Community.'"
The Contracting States opined that the simplification of the
formalities governing the reciprocal recognition and enforcement of judgments would enhance business confidence and
encourage favorable conditions for trade within the Community."
Article 1 of the Convention describes the scope of the
Brussels Convention.' 2 The Convention generally applies to
all civil and commercial matters in which the elements extend
to a Contracting State.' 3 The Court ofJustice of the European
9. See Brussels Convention, supra note 2, pmbl., O.J. L 304/77, at 77; supra note
3 (setting forth text of preamble); see also Dumez Batiment SA and Tracoba Sari v.
Hessische Landesbank, Case 220/88, at *29, [1990] E.C.R. - (January 11, 1990)
(LEXIS, Eurcom library, Cases file) (not yet reported) (stating that purpose of Convention is "to promote the recognition and enforcement ofjudgments in States other
than those in which they were delivered").
10. See P. Jenard, Report on the Convention on jurisdiction and the enforcement ofjudgments in civil and commercial matters, OJ. C 59/1, 3 (1979) [hereinafter Jenard Report].

The Jenard Report noted that the purpose of the Convention is expressed in a note
sent by the Commission of the European Economic Community to the Member
States in 1959 that stated that
a true internal market between the six States will be achieved only if adequate legal protection can be secured. The economic life of the Community
may be subject to disturbances and difficulties unless it is possible, where
necessary by judicial means, to ensure the recognition and enforcement of
the various rights arising from the existence of a multiplicity of legal relationships. As jurisdiction in both civil and commercial matters is derived
from the sovereignty of Member States, and since the effect ofjudicial acts is
confined to each national territory, legal protection and, hence, legal certainty in the common market are essentially dependent on the adoption by
the Member States of a satisfactory solution to the problem of recognition
and enforcement of judgments.
Id. (citations omitted).
11. See id.
12. Brussels Convention, supra note 2, art. 1, OJ. L 304/77, at 78.
13. Id. Article 1 provides that
[t]his Convention shall apply in civil and commercial matters whatever the
nature of the court or tribunal. It shall not extend, in particular, to revenue,
customs or administrative matters.
The Convention shall not apply to:
1. the status or legal capacity of natural persons, rights in property arising out of a matrimonial relationship, wills and succession;
2. bankruptcy, proceedings relating to the winding-up of insolvent
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Communities (the "Court of Justice") has construed the term
"civil and commercial matters" to have a uniform Communitywide meaning that is independent of the national law of one or
4
other of the Contracting States.'
Under the Convention, a court of a Contracting State may
have jurisdiction depending upon the domicile of the defendant.' 5 Article 2, the basic jurisdictional rule, provides that the
defendant "shall" be sued before the Contracting State in
which he has his domicile.' 6 If the defendant is not domiciled
in a Contracting State, the courts of each Contracting State
may apply their respective jurisdictional provisions under national law. 7
companies or other legal persons, judicial arrangements, compositions and
analogous proceedings;
3. social security;
4. arbitration.
Id.
14. LTU Lufttransportunternehmen GmbH & Co. KG v. Eurocontrol, Case 29/
76, [1976] E.C.R. 1541, [1977] 1 C.M.L.R. 88. The Court ofJustice stated that
[a]s Article I serves to indicate the area of application of the Convention it is
necessary, in order to ensure, as far as possible, that the rights and obliga-

tions which derive from it for the Contracting States and the persons to
whom it applies are equal and uniform, that the terms of that provision

should not be interpreted as a mere reference to the internal law of one or
other of the States concerned.
The concept in question must therefore be regarded as independent

and must be interpreted by reference, first, to the objectives and scheme of
the Convention and, secondly, to the general principles which stem from the
corpus of the national legal systems.
Id. at 1551, [1977] 1 C.M.L.R. at 100-01.
15. Brussels Convention, supra note 2, arts. 2, 4, O.J. L 304/77, at 78-79; see infra
notes 16-17 and accompanying text (discussing defendant's domicile as basis for jurisdiction).
16. See Brussels Convention, supra note 2, art. 2, O.J. L 304/77, at 78. Article 2
provides that
[s]ubject to the provisions of this Convention, persons domiciled in a Contracting State shall, whatever their nationality, be sued in the courts of that
State.
Persons who are not nationals of the State in which they are domiciled
shall be governed by the rules ofjurisdiction applicable to nationals of that
State.
Id.

17. See Brussels Convention, supra note 2, art. 4, OJ. L 304/77, at 79. Article 4
provides that "[i]f the defendant is not domiciled in a Contracting State, the jurisdiction of the courts of each Contracting State shall, subject to the provisions of Article
16, be determined by the law of that State." Id.
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Within the general framework of article 2, the Convention
also allows for cases of concurrent jurisdiction in special situations. 8 Articles 5, 6, and 6A provide that in certain instances
another forum may be available as an alternative to that arising
from the rule in article 2.' 9 In those cases, the plainiff thus
may choose to litigate in either the defendant's state of domicile or the alternative forum. 20 For instance, article 5 provides
that concurrent jurisdiction is given to the place of performance in contract claims, the situs of the harmful event in tort
claims, and the place where the agency is located in claims involving corporate agencies. 2 '
In addition to the articles dealing with concurrent jurisdiction, the Brussels Convention qualifies the basic criterion of
domicile defined in article 2 and allows for exclusive jurisdiction in certain matters. 22 Article 16 provides exclusive jurisdic18. Id. arts. 5, 6, 6A, OJ. L 304/77, at 79-80; see infra note 21 (noting articles
providing concurrent jurisdiction).
19. See Brussels Convention, supra note 2, arts. 5, 6, 6A, OJ. L 304/77, at 79-80.
Article 5 provides in part that
[a] person domiciled in a Contracting State may, in another Contracting
State, be sued:
1. in matters relating to a contract, in the courts for the place of performance of the obligation in question;
3. in matters relating to tort, delict or quasi-delict, in the courts for the
place where the harmful event occurred;
5. as regards a dispute arising out of the operations of a branch, agency
or other establishment, in the courts for the place in which the branch,
agency or other establishment is situated;
6. as settlor, trustee or beneficiary of a trust created by the operation of
a statute, or by a written instrument, or created orally and evidenced in writing, in the courts of the Contracting State in which the trust is domiciled.
Id. art. 5, O.J. L 304/77, at 79. Article 6 provides in part that "[a] person domiciled
in a Contracting State may also be sued . . . where he is one of a number of defendants, in the courts for the place where any one of them is domiciled." Id. art. 6(l).
Article 6A provides in part that
[wihere by virtue of this Convention a court of a Contracting State has jurisdiction in actions relating to liability arising from the use ... of a ship, that
court, or any other court substituted for this purpose by the internal law of
that State, shall also have jurisdiction.
Id. art. 6A.
20. See supra note 19 (noting alternative fora in certain causes of action).
21. Brussels Convention, supra note 2, art. 5, O.J. L 304/77, at 78.
22. See id. art. 16, OJ. L 304/77, at 82; id. art. 17, O.J. L 304/77, at 82; see also id.
arts. 13-15, OJ. L 304/77, at 81-82 (providing exclusive jurisdiction in consumer
contracts).
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tion regardless of domicile in matters relating to patents, real
property, or the constitution and dissolution of companies. 2 3
Similarly, article 17 creates exclusive jurisdiction by forum selection clauses in contractual matters.2 4
The Brussels Convention does not refer to the discretionary doctrine of forum non conveniens.2 5 The Convention, how23. See id. art. 16, OJ. L 304/77, at 82. Article 16 provides that
[t]he following courts shall have exclusive jurisdiction, regardless of domicile:
1. in proceedings which have as their object rights in rem ... the courts
of the Contracting State in which the property is situated;
2. in proceedings which have as their object the validity of the constitution, the nullity or the dissolution of companies or other legal persons or
associations . . . the courts of the Contracting State in which the company,
legal person or association has its seat;
3. in proceedings which have as their object the validity of entries in
public registers, the courts of the Contracting State in which the register is
kept;
4. in proceedings concerned with the registration or validity of patents
... the courts of the Contracting State in which the deposit or registration
has been applied for...;
5. in proceedings concerned with the enforcement of judgments, the
courts of the Contracting State in which the judgment has been or is to be
enforced.
Id.
24. See id. art. 17, O.J. L 304/77, at 82. Article 17 provides that
[i]f the parties, one or more of whom is domiciled in a Contracting State,
have agreed that a court or the courts of a Contracting State are to have
jurisdiction to settle any disputes which have arisen or which may arise in
connection with a particular legal relationship, that court or those courts
shall have exclusive jurisdiction. Such an agreement conferring jurisdiction
shall be either in writing or evidenced in writing or, in international trade or
commerce, in a form which accords with practices in that trade or commerce.
Id.
25. See PETER KAYE, CIVIL JURISDICTION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS 1244 (1987). Professor Kaye states that
[i]t has previously been seen to be the position that Convention jurisdiction
is mandatory; that is to say, satisfaction of Convention jurisdiction grounds in
relation to a particular Contracting State's territory obliges the latter's
courts to adjudicate-there being no question of their merely having a discretion to do so or not. . . . To permit of a discretion to derogate from
Convention jurisdiction conferred would not only cause uncertainty to litigants, but would also lead to disruption of the working of the Convention
jurisdiction and enforcement system as a whole, intended to rationalise and
concentrate jurisdiction, thereby to facilitate and simplify recognition and
enforcement, within the Community.
Id. (emphasis in original).
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ever, clearly addresses the problem of lis alibi pendens, 26 a plea
of an action pending in another place. 27 Articles 21 and 23
provide that the court first properly seised of a proceeding involving two Contracting States must exercise jurisdiction.28
Where one of two proceedings is in a non-Contracting State,
article 27(5) gives priority to the earlier judgment given in the
non-Contracting State so as to avoid the possibility that both
judgments would require recognition.29
26. Black's Law Dictionary defines lis alibi pendens as
[a] suit pending elsewhere. The fact that proceedings are pending between
a plaintiff and defendant in one court in respect to a given matter is a
ground for preventing the plaintiff from taking proceedings in another court
against the same defendant for the same object arising out of the same cause
of action.
BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 931 (6th. ed. 1991).
27. Brussels Convention, supra note 2, arts. 21-23, O.J. L 304/77, at 83. Article
21 provides that
[w]here proceedings involving the same cause of action and between the
same parties are brought in the courts of different Contracting States, any
court other than the court first seised shall of its own motion decline jurisdiction in favour of that court.
A court which would be required to decline jurisdiction may stay its
proceedings if the jurisdiction of the other court is contested.
Id. art. 21; for the current amended text of article 21, see also Brussels Convention,
O.J. L 285/1, at 5 (1989). Article 22 provides that
[w]here related actions are brought in the courts of different Contracting
States, any court other than the court first seised may, while the actions are
pending at first instance, stay its proceedings.
A court other than the court first seised may also, on the application of
one of the parties, decline jurisdiction if the law of that court permits the
consolidation of related actions and the court first seised has jurisdiction
over both actions.
For the purposes of this Article, actions are deemed to be related where
they are so closely connected that it is expedient to hear and determine
them together to avoid the risk of irreconcilable judgments resulting from
separate proceedings.
Brussels Convention, supra note 2, art. 22, OJ. L. 304/77, at 83. Article 23 provides
that "[w]here actions come within the exclusive jurisdiction of several courts, any
court other than the court first seised shall decline jurisdiction in favour of that
court." Id. art. 23, O.J. L. 304/77, at 83.
28. See id. art. 21, OJ. L 304/77, at 83; see also Zelger v. Salinitri, Case 129/83,
[1984] E.C.R. 2397, 2408, [1985] 3 C.M.L.R. 366, 379 (holding that words "first
seised" mean "definitively" pending as determined by national law of Contracting
State).
29. Brussels Convention, supra note 2, art. 27(5), OJ. L 304/77, at 84. Article
27(5) provides that
[a] judgment shall not be recognized . . . if the judgment is irreconcilable
with an earlier judgment given in a non-Contracting State involving the
same cause of action and between the same parties, provided that this latter
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B. Forum Non Conveniens and the Brussels Convention
as Law in England
1. Forum Non Conveniens in England
In 1984 England re-examined and endorsed the common
law doctrine offorum non conveniens.3s In doing so, the English
courts have held that their understanding of the doctrine is
now indistinguishable from the seasoned Scottish law principle
of forum non conveniens.3 1 Hence, under English law, a defendant who has been properly served in England now may apply
to English courts to request their discretion to stay the proceedings based on the appropriateness of the relevant jurisdic32
tion.
judgment fulfills the conditions necessary for its recognition in the State
addressed.
Id.; see P.M. NORTH & J.J. FAWCETr, CHESHIRE AND NORTH'S PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL

LAw 423 (11th ed. 1987) (noting that article 27(5) avoids inconsistent judgments
between Contracting and non-Contracting States); see also Owens Bank Ltd. v. Bracco
at *6 (C.A. Mar. 27, 1991) (LEXIS, Enggen library, Cases file) (not yet reported)
(holding in part that Brussels Convention does not apply to proceedings for recognition and enforcement of judgments of non-Contracting States in proceedings under
section 9 of U.K.'s Administration of Justice Act 1920). In Bracco, the Court of Appeal explained that article 27(5)
envisages a judgment given in a non-Contracting State, followed by a judgment in a Contracting State between the same parties and involving the
same cause of action which is irreconcilable with it, followed by a question of
recognition of the later judgment in another Contracting State. In such a
case the later judgment is not to be recognised if, but only if, the earlier
judgment fulfils the conditions for recognition in the Contracting State in
which the question of recognition arises.
Id.
30. See The Abidin Daver, 1984 App. Cas. 398, 411.

31. Id. at 410. The classic statement of Scottish forum non conveniens is found in
Sim v. Robinow, 19 R. 665 (Sess. 1892). In Sim, Lord Kinnear stated that "the plea can
never be sustained unless the Court is satisfied that there is some other tribunal,
having competent jurisdiction, in which the case may be tried more suitably for the
interests of all the parties and for the ends of justice." Id. at 668.
32. Spiliada Maritime Corp. v. Cansulex Ltd., 1987 App. Cas. 460, 474. It is
significant to note Lord Goff of Chieveley's reservation in employing the termforum
non conveniens. Id. Lord Goff stated that

I doubt whether the Latin tag forum non conveniens is apt to describe this
principle. For the question is not one of convenience, but of the suitability
or appropriateness of the relevant jurisdiction. However the Latin tag
(sometimes expressed as forum non conveniens and sometimes as forum
conveniens) is so widely used to describe the principle, not only in England
and Scotland, but in other Commonwealth jurisdictions and in the United
States, that it is probably sensible to retain it. But it is most important not to
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In Spiliada Maritime Corporationv. Cansulex Ltd. , the House
of Lords summarized the current English doctrine offorum non
conveniens. 4 The House of Lords noted that a stay will be
granted on the ground of forum non conveniens only where two
elements are present.3 5 First, the court must be satisfied that
there exists some other available forum having competent jurisdiction over the action. 6 Second, the alternative forum
must be appropriate in that the case may be tried more suitably
there in the interest of justice.37
The House of Lords in Spiliada characterized the appropriate forum by such factors as the law governing the relevant
transaction, the places where the parties reside or carry on
business, and the convenience of maintaining the litigation. 38
Regardless of the appropriateness of the forum, however, reaallow it to mislead us into thinking that the question at issue is one of "mere
practical convenience."
Id.
33. 1987 App. Cas. 460.
34. Id. at 474.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 476. In Spiliada the House of Lords sought to reduce plaintiff's advantage when considering staying in favor of another available forum. See id.; cf
Rockware Glass Ltd. v. MacShannon, 1978 App. Cas. 795, 812 (Lord Diplock). Lord
Diplock had stated that
[i]n order to justify a stay two conditions must be satisfied, one positive and
the other negative: (a) the defendant must satisfy the court that there is another forum to whose jurisdiction he is amenable in which justice can be
done between the parties at substantially less inconvenience or expense, and
(b) the stay must not deprive the plaintiff of a legitimate personal or juridical
advantage which would be available to him if he invoked the jurisdiction of
the English court.
Id. Lord Diplock subsequently recognized in Spiliada that the mere existence of "a
legitimate personal or juridical advantage" of the plaintiff in English jurisdiction is
not decisive. See Spiliada, 1987 App. Cas. at 475 (quoting The Abidin Daver, 1984 App.
Cas. 398, 410 (Lord Diplock)).
37. Spiliada, 1987 App. Cas. at 476-78.
38. Id. The House of Lords characterized the appropriate forum as the "natural
forum," the forum with "which the action had the most real and substantial connection." Id. at 478 (citing The Abidin Daver, 1984 App. Cas. 398,415); see Roneleigh Ltd.
v. MII Exports Inc., [1989] 1 W.L.R. 619, 623-24 (C.A.) (holding that custom of English courts to award costs to successful plaintiff may be taken into account in considering whether either party has juridical advantage). For an example of a recent case
applyingforum non conveniens discretion, see Banco Atlantico S.A. v. British Bank of
the Middle East, [1990] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 504 (C.A.). Interestingly, in Banco Atlantico
S.A., the Court of Appeal refused to stay the English proceedings in favor of the
courts of a non-Contracting State without raising the issue of the applicability of the
Brussels Convention. Id.
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sons ofjustice may deny a stay. 39 One such factor is the ability
of the plaintiff to obtain justice in the foreign jurisdiction.4 °
The House of Lords' endorsement in Spiliada of appropriateness as the main criterion for exercising the doctrine offorum non conveniens represents the latest shift in the English
courts' policy of allowing the trial in England of an essentially
foreign action. 4 ' Prior to Spiliada, the English courts found a
public interest in allowing foreigners to litigate in England because such litigation was considered an important invisible export that corroborated judicial pride in the English system.4 2
The Spiliada decision suggests that the English courts' current
application of the doctrine of forum non conveniens reflects a
43
stronger interest in judicial comity.
39. Spiliada Maritime Corp. v. Cansulex Ltd., 1987 App. Cas. 460, 478.
40. Id. Following the preliminary decision holding that English courts may apply forum non conveniens under the Brussels Convention when the defendant is a domiciliary of England but the conflict of jurisdiction involves a non-Contracting State,
the Court of Appeal, in In re Harrods Ltd., refused to stay proceedings in favor of an
Argentine court stating that the plaintiff could not obtain justice, in the form of relief
of a purchase order, even though trial was admittedly more appropriate in an Argentine court. In re Harrods Ltd., [1991] 3 W.L.R. 423 (C.A.) (Lord Justice Stocker and
Lord Justice Bingham concurring, Lord Justice Dillon dissenting).
41. See P.M. NORTH &J.J. FAWCETT, supra note 29, at 233.
42. See The Atlantic Star, 1973 Q.B. 364, 381-82. Lord Denning boasted that
[n]o one who comes to these courts asking for justice should come in
vain.... This right to come here is not confined to Englishmen. It extends
to any friendly foreigner. He can seek the aid of our courts if he desires to
do so. You may call this "forum-shopping" if you please, but if the forum is
England, it is a good place to shop in, both for the quality of goods and the
speed of service.
Id. The House of Lords subsequently disclaimed these remarks. See The Atlantic Star,
1974 App. Cas. 436, 454 (Lord Reid). Lord Reid stated that the courts should draw
"some distinction between a case where England is the natural forum for the plaintiff
and a case where the plaintiff merely comes here to serve his own ends." Id.; cf P.A.
Stone, The Civil Jurisdiction andJudgments Act 1982: Some Comments, 32 INT'L & COMP.
L.Q 477, 498 (1983). Professor Stone criticized the English doctrine of forum non
conveniens as it was understood prior to Spiliada. See id.He stated that
[w]here a reasonable basis for jurisdiction exists, the court should, with minor exceptions, be required to exercise its jurisdiction and determine the
merits of the dispute. This would avoid dilatory manoeuvres by defendants
which have the aim or at least the result of delaying the litigation, making it
more expensive, and postponing or even avoiding the evil hour of payment.
Id. For the U.S. view, see Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 252 (1981). The
Piper Court stated that "[t]he [U.S.] courts, which are already extremely attractive to
foreign plaintiffs, would become even more attractive. The flow of litigation into the
United States would increase and further congest already crowded courts." Id. (footnotes omitted).
43. See Spiliada, 1987 App. Cas. at 477. The House of Lords noted that "[t]here
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2. The Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982
The Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982 (the "Act"
or "1982 Act") gave legal effect to the Brussels Convention
and its system of jurisdiction in the United Kingdom." The
Act caused fundamental changes in the implementation of
English jurisdictional laws.4 5 Section 49 of the Act provides
that English courts may employ forum non conveniens discretion
only where doing so would not be inconsistent with the Convention. 46 This Section has spawned disagreement as to
whether the application offorum non conveniens, in cases involving a non-Contracting State, is inconsistent with the Brussels
is the further advantage that, on a subject where comity is of importance, it appears
that there will be a broad consensus among major common law jurisdictions." Id.
44. Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982, ch. 27 (Eng.). An interesting
"communautaire" feature of the 1982 Act is that it permits English courts to consider
the official Schlosser and Jenard Reports to the Convention to interpret the provisions of the Convention, and provides that the courts may give the reports "such
weight as is appropriate in the circumstances." Id. § 3(3).
45. See e.g., Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982, sched. 2 (citing article 3
of the Brussels Convention). Article 3 of the Convention provides that
[p]ersons domiciled in a Contracting State may be sued in the courts of another Contracting State only by virtue of the rules set out in Sections 2 to 6
of this Title.
In particular the following provisions shall not be applicable as against
them ... in the United Kingdom: the rules which enable jurisdiction to be
founded on:
(a) the document instituting the proceedings having been served on
the defendant during his temporary presence in the United Kingdom; or
(b) the presence within the United Kingdom of property belonging to
the defendant; or
(c)the seizure by the plaintiff of property situated in the United Kingdom.
Brussels Convention, supra note 2, art. 3, O.J. L 304/77, at 78-79; see also George H.
Carnall III, Jurisdiction-The EEC Convention on Jurisdictionof Courts and Enforcement of
Judgments-Effects on British Common Law Principles, 6 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 633, 636
(1973) (stating that "Great Britain's entry into the Common Market and resulting
adherence to that Convention has affected British principles concerning the jurisdiction of its courts").
46. Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982, ch. 27, § 49 (Eng.). Section 49
provides that
[niothing in this Act shall prevent any court in the United Kingdom from
staying, sisting, striking out or dismissing any proceedings before it, on the
ground offorum non conveniens or otherwise, where to do so is not inconsistent with the 1968 Convention.
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Convention .
C. The Uncertain Application of Forum Non Conveniens Under
the Brussels Convention
Two English commercial courts have considered the application of forum non conveniens in Convention cases involving a
conflict with the jurisdiction of a non-Contracting State.4 8 In
S. & W Berisford Plc. v. New Hampshire Insurance Co. 4 9 and Arkwright Mutual Insurance Co. v. Bryanston Insurance Ltd.,50 the commercial courts found forum non conveniens to be foreign to the
jurisdictional scheme of the Brussels Convention. 5' Berisford
and Arkwright held that since the Convention provided for
compulsory jurisdiction the English courts were precluded
from exercising discretion to decline jurisdiction.5 2
1. The Berisford Decision
In Berisford, the court refused to employ the doctrine of
forum non conveniens on the ground that to do so would contravene the mandatory domicile criteria of article 2.13 The plaintiff was a U.S. company based in New York. 54 The defendant, a
U.S. insurance company, was deemed a domiciliary of the
United Kingdom since the dispute arose out of the operations
of the defendant's London branch.5 5 The defendant insurer
applied for a stay of the proceedings, claiming that the courts
47. See infra notes 48-114 and accompanying text (discussing disagreement
among English courts).
48. See infra notes 49-79 and accompanying text (discussing cases rejecting application offorum non conveniens).

49. [1990] 3 W.L.R. 688 (Q.B.).
50. [1990] 3 W.L.R. 705 (QB.).
51. See Berisford, [1990] 3 W.L.R. 688; Arkwright, [1990] 3 W.L.R. 705 (holding
that English courts do not retain forum non conveniens discretion). It is interesting to
note that both the Berisford and Arkwright decisions held that even if forum non conveniens discretion had been appropriate, England was, nevertheless, the appropriate
forum. See Berisford, [1990] 3 W.L.R. at 701-04; Arkwright, [199013 W.L.R. at 719-24.
52. See Berisford, [1990] 3 W.L.R. at 701-02; Arkwnight, [ 1990] 3 W.L.R. at 711-12;
see also STEPHEN CROMIE, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL LITIGATION 436 n.6 (1990)
(noting Berisford and Arkwright decisions and arguing that English courts must relinquish theirforum non conveniens discretion under Convention).

53. See Berisford, [1990] 3 W.L.R. 688.
54. Id. at 690.
55. Id. Article 8 of the Brussels Convention provides that
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of New York were the appropriate forum.5 6
In refusing to stay the English proceedings, the Berisford
court noted that the Contracting States adopted the Convention to ensure that judgments would be enforceable in any
Contracting State. 5 7 The court recognized that the Contracting States accomplished this objective by harmonizing the
criteria for the valid exercise of jurisdiction among the Contracting States' courts. 5 8 The court observed that article 2
mandates that any defendant domiciled in a Contracting State
must be sued in that State.5 9 The court pointed out that to stay
the English proceedings on the ground offorum non conveniens
would be inconsistent with the uniform domicile criteria of article 2.60
[a]n insurer domiciled in a Contracting State may be [sued]:
1. in the courts of the State where he is domiciled, or
2. in another Contracting State, in the courts for the place where the
policy holder is domiciled, or
3. if he is a co-insurer, in the courts of a Contracting State in which
proceedings are brought against the leading insurer.
An insurer who is not domiciled in a Contracting State but has a
branch, agency or other establishment in one of the Contracting States
shall, in disputes arising out of the operations of the branch, agency or establishment, be deemed to be domiciled in that State.
Brussels Convention, supra note 2, art. 8, O.J. L 304/77, at 80.
56. S. & W. Berisford Plc. v. New Hampshire Insurance Co., [1990] 3 W.L.R.
688, 697 (QB.).
57. Id.
58. Id.; see supra note 3 (discussing objectives of the Convention).
59. Berisford, [1990] 3 W.L.R. at 701-02. For the full text of article 2, see supra
note 16. Of course, the uniformity is subject to article 4. See Brussels Convention,
supra note 2, art. 4, O.J. L 304/77, at 79 (providing that law of Contracting State
applies when defendant not domiciled in any Contracting State). For the full text of
article 4, see supra note 17.
60. See Berisford, [1990] 3 W.L.R. at 701-02. The Berisford court stated that
[i]f the judgments of [Contracting-State courts] are to be recognised and
enforceable in any Convention country it is necessary to know by what criteria the validity of the exercise of jurisdiction of the court giving the judgment or making the order is to be tested by.
Id. at 697; see GEORGE A. L. DROZ, Entrie en vgueur de la Convention de Bruxelles revise sur
la compitencejudiciare et lexicution des jugements, 76 R.C.D.I.P. 251, 258 (1987). Professor Droz, the leading Continental writer on the Convention stated that
[l]orsqu'il y a integration du litige dans la Communaut6 en raison du domicile du d~fendeur . .. la Convention . . . 6tablit des r~gles uniformes de
comp6tence qui ont un caract re imp~ratif.... [T]raditionnellement, les
systbmesjuridiques anglais, 6cossais, voire irlandais, laissent aujuge un tr~s
large pouvoir d'appr~ciation en matibre de competence internationale selon
la doctrine duforum (non) conveniens. On peut estimer [qu'il] n'y a plus lieu
de tenir compte d'une telle doctrine.
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Additionally, the court rejected the defendant's argument
that the Brussels Convention only regulated jurisdiction
among Contracting States. 6 ' According to the Berisford court,
the Convention contemplates that one or the other of the parties may be domiciled in a non-Contracting State. 6 ' The court
explained that article 2 relates to actions brought by persons
not domiciled in a Contracting State, that article 4 applies to
situations where a defendant is not domiciled in a Contracting
State, and that article 12(4) concerns a policy holder not domiciled in a Contracting State.63
The Berisford court thus concluded that the Convention
64
leaves no room for the application of forum non conveniens.
The court found the application of that doctrine to be the type
Id. at 258-59.
61. S. & W. Berisford Plc. v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., [1990] 3 W.L.R. 688, 698
(QB.).
62. Id.

63. Id.; see Brussels Convention, supra note 2, arts. 2, 4, 12(4), OJ. L 304/77, at
78-81. Article 12(4) provides that
[t]he provisions of this Section may be departed from only by an agreement
on jurisdiction:
4. which is concluded with a policy-holder who is not domiciled in a
Contracting State, except in so far as the insurance is compulsory or relates
to immovable property in a Contracting State.
Id. at 81; see supra notes 16-17 (setting forth text of article 2 and article 4). The
Berisford court also submitted that article 16 applies regardless of domicile. See Berisford, [1990] 3 W.L.R. at 698; see also Brussels Convention, supra note 2, art. 16, OJ. L
304/77, at 82; supra note 23 (setting forth text of article 16); see, e.g., Schlosser Report,
supra note 5, O.J. C 59/71, at 112 (discussing certain adjustments pertaining to jurisdiction involving insurance matters requested by United Kingdom upon its accession).
64. Berisford, [1990] 3 W.L.R 688; see Alastair Mennie, The Brussels Convention and
Scottish Courts'Discretionto DeclineJurisdiction,JURID.REV., Dec. 1989, at 150, 167. Mr.

Mennie submits that
had the purpose of the Convention been simply to regulate jurisdiction in
actions involving more than one Contracting State/European Community
Member-State, in paragraph four of the preamble the reference would have
been to "intra-Community jurisdiction" and not to "international jurisdiction."
It is therefore the contention of the present writer that, if called upon,
the European Court is likely to give a ruling to the effect that, in an action in
a Scottish court where jurisdiction is being based on the defender's domicile
in the territory of the court, a significant connection-whatever exactly that
may mean-with any state [including a non-Contracting State] other than
the United Kingdom will render the Convention applicable and, consequently, the upholding of a plea offorum non conveniens a course unavailable
to the court.
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of discretion that would destroy the framework of the Convention. 65 The court thus rejected the defendant's plea offorum
non conveniens, holding that it was inconsistent
with section 49
66
of the Act and the Brussels Convention.
2. The Arkwright Decision

The commercial court in Arkwright also refused to stay
English proceedings on the ground offorum non conveniens. In
Arkwright, the plaintiff was a U.S. insurance company with a
claim against the defendant, a London-based reinsurer. 6 The
defendant resisted payment of the plaintiff's claim and sued in
New York for a declaratory judgment.6 9
The plaintiff insurer subsequently commenced an action
against the defendant reinsurer in London. 70 The defendant
applied to stay the English proceedings on the grounds offo65. Berisford, [1990] 3 W.L.R. at 701; see Schlosser Report, supra note 5, O.J. C 59/
71, at 97. Professor Schiosser argued that the discretion to decline jurisdiction as
between Contracting States should not be permitted because
[a] plaintiff must be sure which court has jurisdiction. He should not have to
waste his time and money risking that the court concerned may consider
itself less competent than another.... Where the courts of several States
have jurisdiction, the plaintiff has deliberately been given a right of choice,
which should not be weakened by application of the doctrine of forum conven"ens.
Id. But see TREVOR C. HARTLEY, CIVIL JURISDICTION AND JUDGMENTS 79 (1984). Professor Hartley believes that forum non conveniens is compatible with the Convention.
Id. He argues that
[i]t is said that the plaintiff must be able to know in advance which courts
will have jurisdiction ....
Another argument is that the other court might
also decline jurisdiction, thus leaving the plaintiff without remedy. These
arguments are unconvincing to anyone familiar with the way in which English, Scottish and American courts operate the doctrine [of forum non conveniens]. The first loses most of its force if one is aware of the fact that a stay
is granted ... in favour of the other court and the second may be met by the
expedient of making the stay conditional on the defendant's submitting to
the jurisdiction of the other court.
Id.
66. S. & W. Berisford Plc. v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., [1990] 3 W.L.R. 688, 700
(QB.). For the full text of Section 49 of the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act of
1982, see supra note 46. The Berisford court further noted that it would not have
stayed the proceedings even if it could exercise discretion to do so. Berisford, [1990] 3
W.L.R. at 701-04.
67. Arkwright Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bryanston Ins. Co. Ltd., [1990] 3 W.L.R. 705
(QB.).
68. Id. at 706-08.
69. Id.
70. Id.
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rum non conveniens and lis alibi pendens,'7 1 contending that New
York was the more appropriate forum.7 2 The court refused to
stay the London proceedings, however, and found the Convention's lis alibi pendens provision inapplicable.73 Moreover,
the court confirmed that English courts may not apply their
forum non conveniens discretion to jurisdictional conflicts under
the Brussels Convention. 4
The Arkwright court followed the reasoning of the Berisford
decision 75 and found no basis for the doctrine offorum non conveniens under the Brussels Convention. 76 According to the
court, the mandatory terms of article 2, subject only to the
Convention's own provisions, suggest that any limitation to article 2 may only come from within the Convention. 77 The
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 718. The Arkwright court did not consider article 21 of the Brussels
Convention applicable to non-Contracting States. Id. Justice Potter reasoned that
article 21
simply requires any Community court to decline jurisdiction or stay an action where another Community court is already seised of it. This seems to
me no more than a simple order of priority, imposed as a necessary aspect
of the certain and orderly regime of jurisdiction and enforcement in and
between the courts of the community. It does not seem to me a persuasive
reason for holding that the Convention contemplates or legitimises an additional and discretionary power, based largely on cost and convenience, to
stay in favour of a non-Community court against a plaintiff who has come to
a court within the Community to try his dispute in accordance with a right
apparently given and a requirement apparently imposed by the Convention
on the basis of the defendant's domicile.
Id. In reaching the above conclusion, Justice Potter noted that several commentators
had contemplated that an English court may retain its discretion to stay. Id. (citing
LAWRENCE

A.

COLLINS, CIVIL JURISDICTION AND JUDGMENTS ACT

1982, at 97 (1983);

O'MALLEY &

LAYTON, EUROPEAN CIVIL PRACTICE 30-31 (1989); A.V. DICEY &J.H. C.
MORRIS, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 398-400 (1987)); see supra note 27 (setting forth full

text of article 21).
74. Arkwright Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bryanston Ins. Ltd., [1990] 3 W.L.R. 705, 718
(QB.).
75. Id. at 713. For the Berisford court's reasoning, see supra notes 57-66 and accompanying text.
76. Arkwright, [1990] 3 W.L.R. at 712.
77. Id. at 711-12. The court stated that the Convention proposes

to provide for the "free movement of judgments" within the Community.
Such purpose was to be achieved by providing, first, for a simple and summary enforcement and recognition procedure... and, second, by harmonising the criteria according to which jurisdiction in Community courts falls to
be exercised . . . so as to allow the court of a contracting state in which
enforcement is sought to avoid going into the merits of the original exercise
of jurisdiction.
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court noted that at the time of the United Kingdom's accession
to the Convention, its delegation did not press for a clarification of the Convention to allow forum non conveniens.78 The
court therefore held that the application offorum non conveniens
would detract from the overall scheme of the Convention and
would be inconsistent with the Convention under section 49 of
the 1982 Act. 7 9
II. HARRODS AND THE APPLICATION OF
DISCRETIONAR YJURISDICTION
In Harrods,"° the Court of Appeal took issue with the rulings in Berisford and Arkwright,8 ' and maintained that a court
may, consistent with the Convention, stay or dismiss proceedings on the grounds offorum non conveniens where a non-Contracting State is a more appropriate forum.8 2 The Harrodsdecision upheld the application offorum non conveniens under English law, notwithstanding the presence of jurisdiction under
article 2 of the Brussels Convention.
A. Factual and ProceduralHistory
In Harrods, the plaintiff and defendant, both Swiss compaId. at 712; see Brussels Convention, supra note 2, art. 2, O.J. L 304/77, at 78; supra
note 16 and accompanying text (providing full text of article 2 and discussing jurisdiction based on domicile of defendant in Contracting State).
78. Arkwright, [1990] 3 W.L.R. at 712 (citing Schlosser Report, supra note 5, OJ. C.
59/71, at 97-98).
79. See Arkwright Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bryanston Ins. Ltd., [1990] 3 W.L.R. 705, 712
(QB.). For the full text of the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982, ch. 27,
§ 49 (Eng.), see supra note 46. The Arkwright court also noted that it would not have
exercised its forum non conveniens discretion, even if it could, because London was
found to be a more appropriate forum than New York. Arkwnght, [1990] 3 W.L.R. at
719-24; see also Mennie, supra note 64, at 162-63. Mr. Mennie argues that
if a United Kingdom court could decline jurisdiction in favour of a United
States court, the certainty which Schlosser feels ought to exist within the
European Community would clearly be lacking. Moreover, where a defender is domiciled in the United Kingdom, a United Kingdom court has
jurisdiction by virtue of, inter alia, article 2; there does not seem to be any
difference in principle between declining jurisdiction in favour of a court of
another Contracting State and declining jurisdiction in favour of a court of a
non-contracting state.
Id.

80. [1991] 3 W.L.R. 397 (C.A. 1990).
81. Id. at 417.
82. Id.
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nies, were the only two shareholders of a company (the "Company") incorporated in England.8" The defendant owned fiftyone percent of the issued shares of the Company, while the
plaintiff owned the remaining forty-nine percent. 8 4 The Company's business and management was carried on exclusively in

Argentina.8 5
The plaintiff sued the defendant in an English court alleging that the Company conducted its affairs in an unfairly prejudicial manner.8 6 The plaintiff requested relief in the form of
an order that the defendant purchase its shares, 7 or in the alternative, that the court grant a winding-up order.8 8 Under the
relevant statutory rules, the Company was found to be a necessary party to the plaintiff's action.89
The defendant moved to have the proceedings stayed on
the grounds of forum non conveniens.90 The defendant alleged
that the trial would be more appropriately heard in an Argentine court. 9 1 After an appeal was taken from the lower court, a
preliminary question was raised in the Court of Appeal in
which the court held that the doctrine of forum non conveniens
was available to the English court to stay or dismiss the petition.9 2
83. Id. at 410.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. The plaintiff brought its petition under section 459 of the Companies
Act 1985 and the Insolvency Act 1986. Id. Sections 41 and 42 of the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982 provides in pertinent part that
(1) Subject to Article 52 .

.

. the following provisions of this section

determine, for the purposes of the 1968 Convention and this Act, whether
an individual is domiciled in the United Kingdom or in a particular part of,
or place in, the United Kingdom or in a state other than a Contracting State.
(3) A corporation or association has its seat in the United Kingdom if
and only if-(a) it was incorporated or formed under the law of a part of the
United Kingdom and has its registered office or some other official address
in the United Kingdom; or (b) its central management and control is exercised in the United Kingdom.
Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982, ch. 27, § § 41(1), 42(3) (Eng.).
87. In re Harrods Ltd., [1991] 3 W.L.R. 397, 410 (C.A. 1990).
88. Id.at 411.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 417.
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B. The Decision of the Court of Appeal
Lord Justice Dillon, writing for the Harrods court, first
noted that the Contracting States implemented the Brussels
Convention to simplify the recognition of judgments between
the Member States through the creation of a common basis of
jurisdiction. 9 3 He observed, however, that such a common basis of jurisdiction should not apply to non-Contracting
States.9 4 Lord Justice Dillon commented that pursuant to article 4, if a defendant is not domiciled in a Contracting State, the
Contracting State's national law determines the jurisdiction.9 5
Furthermore, Lord Justice Dillon suggested that the refusal of
jurisdiction on the ground that a non-Contracting State is the
more appropriate forum does not impair the enforcement of
judgments. 9 6 He reasoned that if the English court indeed refused jurisdiction on the grounds offorum non conveniens, there
would be no English court judgment to be enforced in the
other Contracting States.9 7
Lord Justice Dillon also argued that if the mandatory pro93. Id. at 416. Lord Justice Dillon pointed out that the Convention was
designed pursuant to article 220 of the EEC Treaty, which provides that
Member States shall, so far as necessary, enter into negotiations with each
other with a view to securing for the benefit of their nationals:
- the simplification of formalities governing the reciprocal recognition and
enforcement ofjudgments of courts or tribunals and of arbitration awards.
EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 220; see In re Harrods Ltd., [1991] 3 W.L.R. 397, 416
(C.A. 1990).
94. Harrods, [1991] 3 W.L.R. at 416 (citing Schlosser Report, supra note 5, OJ. C
59/71, at 97). Lord Justice Dillon observed that Professor Schlosser's commentary
on forum non conveniens under the Convention was apparently only concerned with
jurisdiction between courts of several Contracting States. Id. The Schlosser Report
commented that
[a]ccording to the views of the delegations from the Continental Member
States of the Community such possibilities [discretionary powers regarding
jurisdiction] are not open to the courts of those States when, under the 1968
Convention, they have jurisdiction and are asked to adjudicate .... Where
the courts of several States have jurisdiction, the plaintiff has . . . [the]
choice, which should not be weakened by application of the doctrine offorum conveniens ....

To correct rules of jurisdiction in a particular case by

means of the concept offorum conveniens will then be largely unnecessary.
Schlosser Report, supra note 5, O.J. C 59/71, at 97-98.
95. Harrods, [1991] 3 W.L.R. at 416; see Brussels Convention, supra note 2, art.
4., O.J. L 304/77, at 79. For the text of article 4, see supra note 17 and accompanying
text (discussing jurisdiction when defendant not domiciled in Contracting State).
96. Harrods, [1991] 3 W.L.R. at 416.
97. Id.
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visions of article 2 remove the forum non conveniens power of an
English court to decline jurisdiction to entertain an action
against an English domiciliary, 98 then the English court must
also decline jurisdiction on the ground of lis alibi pendens9 9 if
the litigation is pending in the courts of a non-Contracting
State.' O0 Lord Justice Dillon also noted that the language of
articles 21 and 22 is only concerned with proceedings between
Contracting States.' 0 ' He warned that if such a mandatory
reading was also given to articles 21 to 23, then even if the
litigation in the non-Contracting State existed prior to the
0 2
English action, the English courts could not stay the action.1
Similarly, Lord Justice Dillon claimed that to give article 2
such a mandatory effect would also render article 17 inapplicable to matters concerning non-Contracting States.' 0 3 Lord
Justice Dillon noted that article 17 allows parties to negotiate
exclusive jurisdiction agreements to have their disputes settled
in the courts of a particular Contracting State.'0 4 He observed
that article 17 has no provision for such agreements involving
the courts of non-Contracting States. 0 5 He thus submitted
that under a strict interpretation of article 2 an action against a
person domiciled in England must be heard in England regardless of whether the parties had agreed to the jurisdiction
98. Id. Lord Justice Dillon noted that the Berisford and Arkwright decisions referred to the Schlosser andJenardReports in interpreting the provisions of the Brussels

Convention. Id. at 415. Nevertheless, LordJustice Dillon did not give those reports
much weight because he did not believe that the applicability offorum non conveniens to
non-Contracting States had been contemplated by those reports. Id. Furthermore,
at the drafting of the Convention, the English doctrine was considerably less developed, as the Spiliada decision would only come later. Id.
99. In re Harrods Ltd., [1991] 3 W.L.R. 397, 416-17 (C.A. 1990); see Arkwright
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bryanston Ins. Co., [1990] 3 W.L.R. 705, 716 (QB.). The defendant
in Arkwright argued unsuccessfully that articles 21 to 23, which concern lis alibi
pendens, should be considered
as no more than a route to be followed in furtherance of the overall purpose
of avoiding inconsistent judgments within those states. In that respect they
were a signpost (and not a "no entry" sign) in the direction of a jurisdiction
to stay in favour of a pending lis in a non-contracting state.
Id.

100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Harrods, [1991] 3 W.L.R. at 417.
Id.; see supra note 27 (setting forth text of articles 21 and 22).
Harrods, [1991] 3 W.L.R. at 417.
Id.
Id.; see supra note 24 (setting forth text of article 17).
In re Harrods Ltd., [1991] 3 W.L.R. 397, 417 (C.A. 1990).

1991-1992]

IN RE HARRODS LTD.

of some non-Contracting State. 10 6 Lord Justice Dillon found
such a limitation of article 17 to be contrary to the objectives of
07
the Convention.
In a separate opinion, Lord Justice Bingham agreed with
the reasoning of Lord Justice Dillon. Lord Justice Bingham
likewise noted that a purpose of the Convention was to provide
0 8
Contracting States with a common basis of jurisdiction.
Lord Justice Bingham reiterated that the mandatory effect of
article 2 should be interpreted to govern only jurisdictional
conflicts between Contracting States.' 9
The Court of Appeal in Harrods thus decided that the Convention is not concerned with the national jurisdiction of the
Contracting States' courts in cases concerning a competing jurisdiction in a non-Contracting State." 0 The court concluded
that, pursuant to Section 49 of the 1982 Act, a stay or dismissal
of the English proceedings on the ground of forum non conveniens is consistent with the Brussels Convention."'
In arriving at the above holding, the Court of Appeal in
Harrods explicitly exercised its discretion against referral to the
106. Id.; see supra note 16 (setting forth text of article 2).
107. Harrods, [1991] 3 W.L.R. at 417.
108. Id. at 419.
109. Id. at 420-21. In his separate opinion, Lord Justice Bingham stated that
"[w]hen the European Court comes to consider the application of the Convention to non-contracting states, it should seek the answer in treaty interpretation, and ultimately in public international law. The Convention was
intended to regulate jurisdiction as between the contracting states. Thus the
Convention provides that in principle domiciliaries of a contracting state
should be sued in that state, subject to important and far-reaching exceptions, and not in other contracting states. Once a court in a contracting
state has jurisdiction it is entitled, vis-A-vis other states, to exercise that jurisdiction and other courts cannot. But the states which were parties to the
Convention had no interest in requiring a contracting state to exercise a
jurisdiction where the competing jurisdiction was in a non-contracting state.
The contracting states were setting up an intra-Convention mandatory system of Jurisdiction. They were not regulating relations with non-contracting states."
Id. at 422 (quoting Collins, Forum Non Conveniens and the Brussels Convention, 106
L.Q.R. 535, 538-39 (1990)).
110. Id. at 420 (Bingham, L.J.); seeJ.P. Verheul, The Forum (Non) Conveniens in
English and Dutch Law and under some International Conventions, 35 INT'L & COMP. L.Q
413, 422-23 (1986). Mr. Verheul argued that the Convention should allowforum non
conveniens discretion on an ad hoc basis in specific cases of vexation or abuse. Id.
111. In re Harrods Ltd., [1991] 3 W.L.R. 397, 417, 422 (C.A. 1990).
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Court ofJustice." 2 Under the 1971 Protocol, the Court of Appeal should have requested an interpretive ruling" 3 since the
divergence by the Harrods court from the Berisford and Arkwright
decisions suggests that the propriety of the application offorum
non conveniens to non-Contracting States is an important and
difficult point.' 14
III. THE APPLICATION OF FORUM NON CONVENIENS
IN CASES INVOLVING NON-CONTRACTING
STA TES IS APPROPRIATE UNDER
COMMUNITY LA W
Section 49 of the 1982 Act allows English courts the discretion to exercise their forum non conveniens power where no
inconsistency with the Brussels Convention exists.'
In other
words, courts may exerciseforum non conveniens where the Brussels Convention is inapplicable. Thus, U.K. courts must consider the Convention and Community law in resolving issues
that involve a defendant domiciled in a Contracting State and
the fora of a non-Contracting State." 6
112. Id. at 417.
113. See Protocol, supra note 8, art. 3(2),

OJ.

L 304/97, at 98.

114. See Bulmer v. Bollinger, 1974 Ch. 401, 423, [1974] 2 All E.R. 1226, 1235.
In Bulmer, Lord Denning identified the difficulty and importance of the point as one
of the factors to be taken into account in relation to the equivalent discretion under
Article 177 of the EEC Treaty. Id. Indeed, in Customs and Excise Comm 'rs v. ApS Samex,

Justice Bingham, claiming to follow Lord Denning's approach concerning reference
under Article 177, stated that
[t]he choice between alternative submissions may turn not on purely legal
considerations but on a broader view of what the orderly development of
the Community requires. These are questions which the Court of Justice is
much better placed to assess and determine than a national court.
[1983] 1 All E.R. 1042, 1056 (QB. 1982) (Bingham,J.); see NORTH & FAWCETr, supra
note 29, at 283-84 (suggesting extent of discretion in references to Court of Justice
under 1971 Protocol parallels scope of discretion under Article 177 of EEC Treaty).
115. The Civil Jurisdiction andJudgments Act 1982, ch. 27, § 49 (Eng.); see supra
note 46 (containing text of section 49).
116. See The Civil Jurisdiction and Judgment Act 1982, ch. 27, § I (Eng.). The
1982 Act provides in pertinent part that
(1) [any question as to the meaning or effect of any provision of the
Conventions shall, if not referred to the European Court in accordance with
the 1971 Protocol, be determined in accordance with the principles laid
down by and any relevant decision of the European Court.
(2) Judicial notice shall be taken of any decision of, or expression of
opinion by, the European Court on any such question.
(3) Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1), the following
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The drafters of the Brussels Convention, however, restrained from clearly delimiting its international limits. 1 7 The

English Court of Appeal in Harrods properly overruled the
lower courts in holding that the exercise offorum non conveniens
is appropriate in cases involving an English defendant and another forum in a non-Contracting State."' The Harrods opinion is consistent with the theory and provisions of the Brussels
Convention, as well as the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice.
A. The JurisdictionalRules Among Contracting States

A workable system. of international jurisdiction must establish a theory to limit in a predictable fashion any state's
right to assert jurisdiction in a particular case." t9 The cornerstone of the Brussels Convention system of jurisdiction is the
principle that domiciliaries of a Contracting State should be
sued in that State. 120 In addition to the basic jurisdictional
rule, the Convention contains special concurrent and exclusive
jurisdiction rules.'21 In order to reconcile parallel proceedings
reports . . . namely-(a) the reports by Mr. P. Jenard on the 1968 Conven-

tion and the 1971 Protocol; and (b) the report by Professor Peter Schlosser
on the Accession Convention, may be considered in ascertaining the meaning or effect of any provision of the Conventions and shall be given such
weight as is appropriate in the circumstances.
Id. § 3.
117. See KAYE, supra note 25, at 220.
118. Compare supra notes 48-79 and accompanying text (holding English courts
do not have forum non conveniens discretion) with supra notes 80-114 and accompanying
text (holding English courts retain theirforum non conveniens discretion).
119. See Joseph Halpern, "ExorbitantJurisdiction" and the Brussels Convention: Towarda Theory of Restraint, 9 YALEJ. OF WORLD PUB. ORD. 369, 370 (1983). A system of

jurisdiction must delineate claims that are considered abusive to a defendant and
therefore "exorbitant." Id By prohibiting Contracting States from exercising certain bases of exorbitant jurisdiction against other Contracting States, the Convention
made it easier to obtain transnational recognition and enforcement ofjudgments. See
Jenard Report, supra note 10, O.J. C 59/1, 3 (discussing purpose of Brussels Convention); Brussels Convention, supra note 2, art. 3, O.J. L 304/77, at 78-9 (prohibiting
Contracting States' "exorbitant" jurisdiction practices). In the view of Professors
North and Fawcett, under the Convention, generalforum non conveniens discretion is
unnecessary since it "operates as an antidote to exorbitant bases of jurisdiction."
NORTH & FAWCETr, supra note 29, at 327.

120. See Brussels Convention, supra note 2, art. 2, O.J. L 304/77, at 78; see supra
note 16 (setting forth text of article 2).
121. See Brussels Convention, supra note 2, arts. 5, 6, 6A, 16, 17, O.J. L 304/77,
at 79-80, 82; supra notes 18-24 and accompanying text (discussing concurrent and
exclusive jurisdiction).
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in the courts of different Contracting States, articles 21 and 23
provide that the court first properly seised must exercise jurisdiction. 1 22 As a result, the principle offorum non conveniens discretion is unnecessary as a means of reconciling competing
proceedings as between Contracting States.
B. Application of Forum Non Conveniens to
Non-Contracting States
In contending that Contracting State courts are bound to
accept jurisdiction, the Berisford and Arkwright courts relied on
the language of article 2.123 The Convention governs relations
only among Contracting States. The mandatory language of
article 2 is not concerned with the national jurisdiction of
courts of a Contracting State to exercise the doctrine of forum
non conveniens in conflicts involving the jurisdiction of non-Contracting States.
1. The Case Law of the Court of Justice
In a case involving the jurisdiction of a non-Contracting
State, article 2 may be viewed only as allocating initial jurisdiction. Article 2 thus does not require that the judgment be rendered in the court of a Contracting State. As a result, the
court's power to decline jurisdiction on the ground of forum
non conveniens in favor of a more appropriate forum in a non2 4
Contracting State is unaffected by the Convention.
122. See Brussels Convention, supra note 2, arts. 21, 23, O.J. L 304/77, at 83; see
supra note 27 (setting forth full text of articles 21, 23).

123. See supra notes 59 & 77 and accompanying text (noting explicit language of
article 2).
124. See KAYE, supra note 25, at 1245. Professor Kaye argued that the grant of
jurisdiction under the Convention imparts the Contracting State the "power to decline in favour of non-Contracting State jurisdiction." Id. He further argued that
this jurisdiction is not
affected by the fact that under certain Convention provisions-such as Articles 2, 16 and 17- it is expressly stated that Contracting States' courts shall
have jurisdiction when the connection prescribed thereunder is satisfied in
relation to their territory, since such jurisdiction may be regarded as only
being thus obligatory in relation to competing jurisdiction claims within the
Community and under the Convention system, not as regards the entire
outside world.
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In Kongress Agentur Hagen GmbH v. Zeehaghe BV, 1 25 the
Court of Justice considered whether the procedural rules of a
Contracting State may modify jurisdiction under article 6 of
the Brussels Convention. 26 In Hagen, a Dutch plaintiff sued a
German defendant before a Dutch court on the basis of article
5(1) of the Convention. 2 7 The defendant argued that article
6(2) mandated the joinder of a German third party against
28
whom the defendant would claim indemnity.'
Under Dutch national procedural rules, however, the
Dutch court concluded that the third party proceedings would
overly complicate and protract the plaintiff's suit. 1 29 As a result, the Dutch court refused to join the third party despite the
apparent applicability of article 6(2) of the Convention.13 0 In a
preliminary ruling, the Court of Justice held that the Brussels
Convention does not require the Dutch court to permit the
joinder of the third party as long as the operation of Dutch
procedural law does not prejudice the effectiveness of the Con3
vention.' '
In Hagen, the Court reasoned that while the Brussels Convention determines jurisdiction among Contracting States, it
does not unify national procedural rules. 3 2 The Court noted
125. Case 365/88, [1990] E.C.R. - (May 15, 1990) (LEXIS, Eurcom library,
Cases file) (not yet reported) [hereinafter Hagen].
126. Id.
127. Id. at * 15; see supra note 19 (setting forth text of article 5(1)).
128. Hagen at *15; see Brussels Convention, supra note 2, art. 6(2), OJ. L 304/
77, at 79-80. Article 6(2) provides that
[a] person domiciled in a Contracting State may also be sued:
2. as a third party in an action on a warranty or guarantee or in any
other third party proceedings, in the court seised of the original proceedings, unless these were instituted solely with the object of removing him
from the jurisdiction of the court which would be competent in his case.
Id.

129. Hagen at *2-3.
130. Id.
131. Id. at *17. The Court ofJustice in Hagen held that
[alrticle 6(2) must be interpreted as meaning that it does not require the
national court to accede to the request for leave to bring an action on a
warranty or guarantee and that the national court may apply the procedural
rules of its national law in order to determine whether that action is admissible, provided that the effectiveness of the Convention in that regard is not
impaired.
Id.

132. Id.
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that Community law limited the application of national procedural rules only where the application of such rules restricts
the rules of jurisdiction under the Brussels Convention.133
Recognizing that article 6(2) merely determines which Contracting State has jurisdiction, the Court in Hagen concluded
that the conditions for admissibility
of the action remain sub34

ject to national procedural rules.

Thus, under Hagen, a Dutch court may decline jurisdiction
35
over a third party as a procedural matter under article 6.1
Accordingly, under jurisdiction based on article 2, an English
court should be permitted to utilize its "procedural"forum non
conveniens discretion in a conflict of jurisdiction with a nonContracting State without infringing the objectives of the Convention. 1 36 Certainly, such a modification of article 2 does not
133. Id. (citing Duijnstee v. Goberbauer, Case 288/82, [1983] E.C.R. 3663,
[1985] 1 C.M.L.R. 220 (holding in part that article 19 requires Contracting State to
declare it lacks jurisdiction whenever it finds another Contracting State with exclusive
jurisdiction under article 16)). The Court of Justice in Duijnstee concluded that "the
Convention, which seeks to determine the jurisdiction of the courts of the Contracting States ...must override national provisions which are incompatible with it."
[1983] E.C.R. at 3675, [1985] 1 C.M.L.R. at 234.
134. Hagen, Case 365/88, at *17, [1990] E.C.R. - (May 15, 1990) (LEXIS,
Eurcom library, Cases file) (not yet reported).
135. Id.; cf Marc Rich & Co. AG v. SocietA Italiana Impianti PA, Case 190/89,
[1991] E.C.R. - (July 25, 1991) (LEXIS, Eurcom library, Cases file) (not yet reported) (noting that article 1(4) of Convention excludes arbitration agreements from
scope of Convention, and holding that Contracting State courts may apply their own
national law to determine validity of arbitration agreements).
136. See Adrian Briggs, Spiliada and the Brussels Convention, 1 LLOYD'S MAR. COM.
L.Q. REV., Feb. 1991, at 10, 13. Mr. Briggs observed that
[i]f it is true of Art. 6 that rules of national procedural law may operate to
modify this jurisdictional rule, will this not equally be so for jurisdiction
based on any and all of the other provisions? If so, jurisdiction based upon
the domicile of the defendant [article 2] will also be subject to the procedural law of the forum.
Id. (footnote omitted). But see Adrian Briggs, Forum non Conveniens and the Brussels

Convention Again, 107 L.Q.R. 180, 181 (1991). Mr. Briggs, however, queried that
if one of the purposes of the Convention is to allow those domiciled in contracting states (or elsewhere, for the matter of that) to be sure that they can
proceed against a defendant where he is domiciled, then Re Harrods [and the
application offorum non conveniens as a national procedural rule] will be contrary to the aims of the Convention.
Id.; seeJenard Report, supra note 10, O.J. C 59/1, at 13. ProfessorJenard notes that the
territory of the Contracting States "may be regarded as forming a single entity." Id.;
see Brussels Convention, supra note 2, pmbl., O.J. L 304/77. The preamble states that
the Convention "strengthen[s] in the Community the legal protection of persons
therein established." Id. For the full text of the preamble, see supra note 3.
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run afoul of the Court's caveat in Hagen and does not prejudice
the recognition or enforcement ofjudgments as between Contracting States. 3 7
2. The Provisions
The general article 2 domicile rule does not thwart a stay
or dismissal in all cases.'13 Rather, article 2 is a general rule
within a complicated framework of provisions that acknowledge exceptions in particular situations. 3" For example, article 2 is preempted by both article 17140 which permits foreign
jurisdiction clauses, and by the exclusive jurisdiction provision
of article 16.11'
Moreover, the Contracting States did not design the Convention to ignore the competing claims of non-Contracting
States.'42 If article 2 is given full mandatory effect,' 43 jurisdic137. See Brussels Convention, supra note 2, pmbl., O.J. L 304/77, at 77 (discussing the goal of the Convention); supra note 3 (setting forth text of preamble); see also
Owens Bank Ltd. v. Bracco, *5 (C.A. March 27, 1991) (LEXIS, Enggen library, Cases
file) (not yet reported). The Bracco court posited that
[a]t least prima facie the reciprocal recognition and enforcement of the
judgments of non-contracting state A in contracting states B and C must
depend wholly on the arrangements between state A and states B and C
respectively. It has nothing whatever to do with anyone else.
Id.; cf Overseas Union Ins. Ltd. v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., Case 351/89, [1991]
E.C.R. -, 2 CEC 73. To limit the risk of irreconcilable judgments, the Court of
Justice in Overseas broadly interpreted article 21 of the Convention to apply irrespective of the domicile of the parties to the two sets of proceedings. Id.
138. See Brussels Convention, supra note 2, art. 2, O.J. L 304/77, at 78; supra
note 16 (setting forth full text of article 2).
139. Brussels Convention, supra note 2, arts. 16-17, O.J. L 304/77, at 82; see
Arkwright Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bryanston Ins. Co. Ltd., [1990] 3 W.L.R. 705, 716 (QB.).
140. Brussels Convention, supra note 2, art. 17, O.J. L 304/77, at 82; see supra
note 24 (setting forth full text of article 17).
141. Brussels Convention, supra note 2, art. 16, O.J. L 304/77, at 82; supra note
23 (setting forth text of article 16); see also Brussels Convention, supra note 2, arts. 56, O.J. L 304/77, at 79-80; supra note 19 and accompanying text (setting forth text of
articles 5 and 6 that provide alternative jurisdiction to that arising from rule in article
2).
142. See KAYE, supra note 25, at 1244-45. Professor Kaye stated that
[i]t
was further stated to be the view of the present writer, however, that in
relation to non-ContractingState jurisdiction, national rules on lis
alibipendens
and forum non conveniens-to the extent that they are generally admittedcontinue to apply, notwithstanding Convention jurisdiction otherwise possessed. The Community does not exist in a vacuum.
Id.
143. See Schlosser Report, supra note 5, OJ. C 59/71, at 97-98. Professor Schlosser

noted that "the view was expressed that under the 1968 Convention the Contracting
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tion may be assigned to the courts of the most appropriate
Contracting State, in cases where it may be in fact more appropriate to have the trial in a non-Contracting State. 4 ' For instance, if a defendant domiciled in England were sued in respect of the ownership of a building in New York City, the
Convention would still require trial in England. 4 5 The defendant in an English court may have difficulty obtaining the
relevant evidence and witnesses which would have been readily
1 46
available to a U.S. court.
States are not only entitled to exercise jurisdiction in accordance with the provisions
laid down in Title 2; they are also obliged to do so." Id. at 97. But see A. DASHWOOD,
ET AL., A GUIDE TO THE CIVIL JURISDICTION AND JUDGMENTS CONVENTION 22 n.17
(1987). Professor Dashwood argues that article 2 jurisdiction is mandatory and that
only
if the principal Convention provisions are interpreted independently and
without consideration of special features of national legal systems will the
Convention attain its full effect of providing a uniform system for taking
jurisdiction and enforcing judgments in litigation falling within its scope.
Id.

144. See Arkwright Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bryanston Ins. Co. Ltd., [1990] 3 W.L.R.
705, 716 (QB.). The defendant in Arhwright unsuccessfully argued that
[i]f there is no jurisdiction for a contracting state in which a defendant is
domiciled or otherwise properly sued to decline jurisdiction [as there is
under articles 21 and 22 as between Contracting States, i.e. the court first
seised], or to stay, in favour of the courts of a non-contracting.state, that
creates the remarkable situation whereby the Convention determines the
appropriate forum (according to its own provisions) for the competing jurisdictions of contracting states, but requires entertainment of suit in the domicile of the defendant (without the application of any test of appropriateness) where a non-contracting state is concerned.
Id.

145. Cf Stone, supra note 42, at 498. Professor Stone proposes that a Contracting State should have discretion to decline jurisdiction in favor of a non-Contracting State
where either: (i) the matter in dispute is connected with that State in such a
way that, if it had been so connected with a Contracting State, its courts
would have had exclusive jurisdiction under Article 16 (e.g. where the dispute is principally concerned with title to New York land, or with the dissolution of a company seated in New York); or (ii) the parties have entered
into an agreement which purports to confer exclusive jurisdiction over the
dispute on a court or the courts of a non-Contracting State, and which, apart
from the fact that the chosen court or courts are of a non-Contracting State,
would have been effective under Article 17; or (iii) an identical or related
claim is the subject of proceedings in a non-Contracting State which were
instituted before the British action.
Id. at 498-99.
146. See Verheul, supra note 110, at 421-22. Professor Verheul argues that
[t]he question whether forum non conveniens is consistent with the Conven-

tion, and if so, to what extent is still open. .

.

. [W]hen in a specific case
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Similarly, article 27(5) provides indirect authority for the
proposal that the Convention's system permits the exercise of
a stay in the above situation. 4 7 Article 27(5) provides that a
judgment given in one Contracting State shall not be recognized in another Contracting State if the judgment is irreconcilable with an earlier judgment given in a non-Contracting
State.' 4 8 This provision implies that since the Convention is
designed to prevent inconsistent judgments, the court of a
Contracting State may stay a proceeding in its jurisdiction in
49
favor of the court of a non-Contracting State already seised.4'
Since the provisions of the Convention that confer jurisdiction
are preempted by cases involving article 27(5), that article may
thus be viewed as a "signpost" indicating that under the Convention system English courts may continue to applyforum non
conveniens where to do so does not prejudice the purposes of
the Convention. 150
The Schlosser Report also presents indirect support for
this proposition.'
Professor Schlosser notes that parties may
agree to confer jurisdiction on the courts of a non-Contracting
justice demands an ad hoc deviation from the general rules because of particular circumstances, it is and remains the task of the judge to do justice.
Id.

147. See Brussels Convention, supra note 2, art. 27(5), O.J. L 304/77, at 84; supra
note 29 (setting forth text of article 27(5)).
148. Id.
149. See supra note 29 and accompanying text (discussing purpose of article
27(5)); see also Arkwright Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bryanston Ins. Co. Ltd., [1990] 3 W.L.R.
705, 716 (Q.B.). Lord Justice Potter commented that -[t]hese are powerful arguments, and it is certainly not clear that one at least of them, namely the reliance
placed on article 27(5), was advanced before HobhouseJ. in the Berisford case." Id.
150. See HARTLEY, supra note 65, at 77. Professor Hartley queries:

What is the position where lis alibi pendens applies with reference to a nonContracting State? The Convention does not require English courts to
grant a stay in such cases but does it prevent them from doing so? The
wider aspects of this question are discussed below, here it need only be said
that article 27(5) provides indirect support for the view that the Convention
does not preclude the granting of a stay or dismissal of the action.
Id. Professor Hartley goes so far as to argue that English courts should retain their
power to decline jurisdiction whether or not there exists a jurisdictional conflict with
another Contracting State. Id. He suggests, however, that "as the European Court
consists mainly of Continental lawyers, it is by no means certain that the English
courts will be allowed to retain their discretion to stay." Id. at 80; see also IAN F.
FLETCHER, CONFLICT OF LAWS AND EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 124 (1982) (arguing
for application of forum non conveniens to mitigate jurisdiction under article 5(1) of
Brussels Convention).
151. See Schlosser Report, supra note 5, O.J. C 59/71, at 124.
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State. 52 In that situation, Professor Schlosser posits that a
Contracting State court may assess the validity of the agreement in accordance with its national law, presumably because
no other Contracting State is involved. 5 3 Similarly, England
should be able to retain its own forum non conveniens discretion
when the conflict involves another and more appropriate fo54
rum in a non-Contracting State.
3. The Purposes
As mentioned above, the Contracting States enacted the
Brussels Convention to facilitate the recognition and enforcment of Contracting State judgments throughout the Community while protecting domiciliaries of Contracting States from
the exercise of exorbitant jurisdiction by the courts of other
Contracting States. 5 5 It is hard to see how this interest would
be prejudiced by allowing a Contracting State court to employ
the doctrine of forum non conveniens in favor of a non-Contracting State court. This appears to be further supported by
the fact that whether a non-Contracting State court's subsequent judgment is enforceable in a Contracting State still depends on bilateral arrangements between the non-Contracting
State and that Contracting State.' 5 6
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. See HARTLEY, supra note 65, at 80 (arguing that Schlosser Report supports
English courts' forum non conveniens discretion).

155. See supra note 10 (discussing purpose and theory of Brussels Convention).
156. See Owens Bank Ltd. v. Bracco, *5-6 (C.A. March 27, 1991) (LEXIS, Enggen library, Cases file) (not yet reported). The Bracco court noted that pursuant to
article 27(5), a judgment given in a Contracting State subsequent to a judgment
given in a non-Contracting State
is not to be recognised if, but only if, the earlier judgment fulfils the conditions for recognition in the Contracting State in which the question of recognition arises. Here, surely, is explicit acceptance that as between a nonContracting State and a Contracting State the recognition of the judgment
of the non-Contracting State is a matter wholly dependant upon the arrangements between the non-Contracting State and the Contracting State
and that those arrangements will prevail in the event of conflict if the judgment of the non-Contracting State precedes the irreconcilable judgment of
the Contracting State.
Id. at *6-7; see also In re Harrods Ltd., [1991] 3 W.L.R. 397 (C.A. 1990) (Bingham
L.J.). LordJustice Bingham pointed out that if the Harrods court had stayed the English proceedings in favor of an Argentine court, the enforceability of that judgment in
another Contracting State would not come within the scope of the Convention. Id.
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Furthermore, article 2 itself should be interpreted to reflect the scheme of the Convention. 57 The Brussels Convention is concerned with deciding which of the Contracting
States should exercise jurisdiction in cases of conflict inter se.' 58
No inconsistency is brought about by one Contracting State
staying proceedings in favor of a non-Contracting State.' 59
CONCLUSION
Although the doctrine of forum non conveniens is unknown
in Continental legal systems, Community law does not prevent
English courts from preserving their discretion to stay proceedings, in conflicts involving a defendant domiciliary, in
favor of more appropriate courts in a non-Contracting State.
Where the provisions of the Brussels Convention do not address a legal question, the answer must be sought in the objectives and scheme of the Convention. The English Court of Appeal in Harrods properly understood that Community law does
not require ritualistic reliance on the Convention's jurisdiction
157. See Brussels Convention, supra note 2, pmbl., O.J. L 304/77, at 77; supra
note 3 (setting forth text of Preamble and declaring that Convention is concerned
with strengthening legal protection within Community).
158. See Hagen, Case 365/88, at "17, [1990] E.C.R. - (May 15, 1990) (LEXIS,
Eurcom library, Cases file) (not yet reported). The Court of Justice in Hagen
stressed that the object of the Convention is not to unify procedural rules
but to determine which court has jurisdiction in disputes relating to civil and
commercial matters in intra-Community relations and to facilitate the enforcement of judgments.
Id.; see also Brussels Convention, supra note 2, art. 4, O.J. L 304/77, at 79 (permitting
application of national Contracting State jurisdictional rules when defendant not
domiciled in Contracting State); supra note 17 (containing text of article 4); KAYE,
supra note 25, at 1245 (arguing that proper scope of Convention is within Community).
159. See Arkwright Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bryanston Ins. Co. Ltd., [1990] 3 W.L.R.
705, 713 (Q.B.) (citing S. & W. Berisford Pic. v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., [1990] 3
W.L.R. 688 (QB.) (Hobhouse, J.)); see also Owens Bank Ltd. v. Bracco (C.A. April 12,
1991) (LEXIS, Enggen library, Cases file) (not yet reported). The Bracco court stated
that the
preamble appears to us to indicate clearly, as one might expect, that the
Convention is concerned with the jurisdiction of the courts of Contracting
States inter se and the reciprocal recognition and enforcement of the judgments of the courts of Contracting States inter se. We say "as one might
expect" because it would be surprising if Contracting States were seeking to
affect the position of persons over whom their courts had no jurisdiction
Id. at *4-5.
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conferring provisions in cases involving a defendant domiciled
in a Contracting State and thejurisdication of a court in a nonContracting State.
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